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Abstract
Adam Smith considered consumption the sole end and purpose of
all production. Concerning the measurement of welfare, this requi-
res a sound understanding of the connection between consumption
and welfare. The consumerist conceptualization of this connection
implies that the amount of consumption equals welfare and the level
of production can be an indicator for welfare. The limits and pro-
blems of production measures are widely accepted. Yet, indicators
like GDP remain the focus of mainstream economic theory and po-
licy. We trace the origin of this lock-in back to the economic model
of behaviour and the concept of agency in mainstream economics.
The suggested alternative stems from literature about human needs
in heterodox economics and psychology. This literature incorporates
the relevance of social aspects and cultural change for welfare. It
turns out that consumerism can be a threat to well-being and welfare
rather than a requirement for it.
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1 Introduction
Recent debates about the measurement of welfare in economics have stres-
sed the limits of production indicators (e.g. OECD, 2011; Stiglitz et al.,
2009). Yet, economic theory and policy is still predominantly focused on
production and consumption. This poses a serious open issue which calls
for a reorientation of economic theory, capable of tackling the critique, in
order to analyze the connection between economic activity and welfare, and
draw the resulting policy implications.
We use the term welfare in the sense of what a society might want to
achieve. In this sense welfare relates to, or coincides with terms like well-
being, standard of living, human flourishing, the good life, or Eudaimonia.
In this paper we distinguish two types of approaches to welfare: pre-
ference based approaches (neoclassical welfare economics, happiness eco-
nomics, and the capabilities approach; section 2) and human need based
approaches (section 3).
Based on utilitarian ethics, commensurability and liberalism, preferences
based approaches refrain from statements about the relevance and qualita-
tive relations of different elements of welfare. Contrary to that, human need
based approaches specify a set of needs determining welfare. They deal with
the relations of needs and thresholds of need satisfaction.
Human need based approaches can be found in the discourse about de-
velopment (Max-Neef, 1992; Alkire, 2002), and more recently, the discourse
about sustainability (O’Neill, 2011; Gough, 2015). They criticise and reject
economic preference theory and the concept of agency in mainstream eco-
nomics, since preference theory excludes any social influences on behaviour
and welfare. Preference theory also excludes the effects of adaptive pheno-
mena and cultural change, which might change preferences (Gough, 2015,
p.1193). The necessity for a methodological framework which is able to
incorporate these phenomena has been a key issue in heterodox economics
(Hodgson, 1988; Zizzo, 2003; Rodrigues, 2004).
We look for a model of behaviour and a concept of agency capable of ta-
king the effects of social and adaptive phenomena into account. Our paper
indicates that a human need based approach to welfare can provide such
concepts, which are able to tackle some of the main objections against prefe-
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rence based approaches to welfare. Drawing on Self-determination theory, a
hugely influential framework in psychological research about human needs,
the paper facilitates a deeper understanding of the connection between eco-
nomic activity and welfare.
This adds to a longstanding discussion about the relation between psy-
chology and economics (Kahneman, 2003; Earl, 2005; Hands, 2010; Glaze,
2016). This article contributes to closing the gap between heterodox econo-
mics and psychology (Earl, 2005) and stresses the importance of looking at
what kind of psychology economics is engaging with (Hands, 2010).
2 Preference Based Approaches to Welfare
2.1 Neoclassical Economics and Commodity Welfare
This section illustrates from a history of economic thought perspective the
rationale for conceiving commodities as welfare in neoclassical economics.
Measures like GDP per capita became the predominant indicator for com-
modity welfare. Commodity welfare is the result of several major shifts
in the concept of welfare in neoclassical economics. In order to illustrate
this, we depict the evolution of the definition of economics, beginning with
William Stanley Jevons, to Alfred Marshall, to Lionel Robbins.
Human action for Jevons simply follows the human need to maximise
pleasure:
"The theory which follows is entirely based on a calculus of
pleasure and pain; and the object of Economics is to maximise
happiness by purchasing pleasure." (Jevons, 1871, p.23)
Jevons does not believe that a more exact definition is needed. Humans
act to maximize pleasure, and every action follows the goal of increasing
utility. There is no limit to its satisfaction. "But the more refined and
intellectual our needs become, the less are they capable of satiety. To the
desire for articles of taste, science, or curiosity, when once excited, there is
hardly a limit." (Jevons, 1871, p.53) Jevons explicitly develops this model
of behaviour in the tradition of Bentham (Jevons, 1871, p.38).
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Alfred Marshall, the father of the term Economics, is already less ex-
plicit about the Benthamite roots of orthodox economic methodology. In
Principles of Economics Marshall defines economics:
"Political economy or economics is a study of mankind in
the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual
and social action which is most closely connected with the attai-
nment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing.
Thus it is on the one side a study of wealth; and on the other,
and more important side, a part of the study of man." (Marshall,
1890, p.1)
Human needs are split into two dimensions: material and immaterial, with
economics only being interested in the first. Human needs, limited to the
material sphere, as well as the human being itself, are central to economic
analysis. Wealth is seen as the answer only to the material side of human
needs. Marshall departs from Jevons and distances economics from the
utilitarian tradition, accepting other influences on human action than the
mere pursuit of wealth (p.17). Human behaviour and human needs, to him,
are more complicated and not reducible to a mere pursuit of pleasure and
avoidance of pain. But this has no consequence for the economic model of
behaviour. It remains dependent on human action to follow the simple logic
of Bentham. In order to reconcile the explicit renouncement of utilitarianism
and his continued use of the utilitarian logic, he claims it to be a proxy which
on average is correct (p.24-26). In the end, Marshall’s humility towards the
validity of the psychological foundations of economic methodology is no
more than a smoke-screen around the assumptions about values and human
behaviour to make the mechanics of economic methodology work.
Marshall’s approach to economics was further refined by Lionel Robbins,
whose definition is widely accepted today. Economics, he argues, should
be broader in the sense that it is not only limited to the material sphere
(Robbins, 1932, p.6f). For Robbins all of human behaviour is subject of and
can be explained by economics (p.12f), because, human life is characterized
by scarce means to multiple ends: "Every act which involves time and scarce
means for the achievement of one end involves the relinquishment of their
use for the achievement of another. It has an economic aspect." (p.14). He
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consequentially derives what is today widely accepted as the definition of
economics:
"Economics is the science which studies human behavior as
a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alter-
native uses." (Robbins, 1932, p.16)
Marshall’s idea that the satisfaction of human needs is to be seen as more
complex than just utility maximizing is dropped. This is done in line with
Marshall’s avoidance of invoking any of Jevons’ psychological foundations.
Marshall installs a smoke-screen around Jevons’ psychological founda-
tion, to take a more humble position on its reach. Robbins departs from
the humble position, while keeping the smoke-screen. Lionel Robbins dis-
misses both the psychological foundations and the acceptance of limitations
in explanatory power. The economic model of behaviour does not change,
but what changes radically is the perception of the model. Following Rob-
bins’ definition it is not the object of study which defines economics but its
method.
While Jevons and Marshall still refer to human needs, Robbins shifts
the issue into a sphere which is not to be touched upon by economics. By
describing human needs as "attaching values", they are seen to be subjective
to the individual, and therefore not relevant. With this trick, Robbins
claims to have removed any normative aspects, in particular utilitarianism.
He creates the illusion of economics as a positivist science, which may not
discuss human needs, as they are purely subjective to the individual.
The psychological foundation of the economic model of behaviour beco-
mes hidden. Hans Albert (1998, p.179) calls this the "expulsion" (Hinaus-
wurf) and Tibor Scitovsky (1976, p.15) the "expurgation" of psychology.
The consequence however, is not the removal of the utilitarian mechanics,
but the depletion of the concept of utility. After removing the explicit links
to Bentham it is not clear anymore what utility actually stands for. Hans
Albert takes this to argue that whenever there is debate of human needs in
relation to the economic model of behaviour, it is empty talk (1998, p.181).
Scitovsky sees the debate reduced to "logical implications of the assumption
of man’s rationality" (1976, p.15). Utility can now only be interpreted as
the satisfaction of choice.
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A social vacuum is created around the model by confining values to the
market sphere and effectively ridding human behaviour of its social cha-
racter. In this vacuum the economic model of behaviour can be applied
to explain everything, from crime to drug use to marriage (Becker, 1968;
Becker et al., 1991; Becker, 1973). All values can be commodified and in-
tegrated into a market. The existence of markets has to be presupposed
(Becker, 1978, p.5f). If it is not marketable it can not be valuable, or re-
versed, if it is valuable, there is a market for it. Values become consumer
preferences, they become the choice between products, the choice between
multiple options. Consequently, welfare is measured in terms of commodi-
ties. Agency is conceived as the optimization of an exogenously given and
stable preference function for commodities. No power issues can arise in the
process of preference satisfaction due to the axioms of stable preferences and
consumer sovereignty (Fellner and Spash, 2015; Galbraith, 1970).
2.2 Happiness Economics
As the name suggests, according to happiness economics welfare is concep-
tualised as feelings of happiness. Using happiness as an indicator for welfare,
two different approaches within happiness economics can be found:
• a) happiness economics as a critique of commodity welfare and eco-
nomic growth (Easterlin, 2001, 1974)
• b) happiness economics as a validation of neoclassical welfare econo-
mics (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2009)
Both approaches conceive decision taking as the maximization of happi-
ness. The conclusions drawn, however, could not be further apart. Easterlin
(1974) empirically shows that total subjective happiness rises in line with
total income only up to a certain point. After this threshold has been pas-
sed, happiness does not increase with total income. This is dubbed the
Easterlin Paradox, as it is not accommodated within the economic model
of behaviour, in which growing income comes with growing utility and the-
refore growing happiness. Easterlin’s explanation for this is what he calls
life aspirations (Easterlin, 2001). Parallel to growing income, aspirations re-
garding material goods rise, requiring a higher level of consumption for the
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same level of utility or happiness. This explanation poses a contradiction
since changes in aspirations constitute an adaptive phenomenon, excluded
by economic preference theory which happiness economics generally appro-
ves. The conclusion, drawn from the Easterlin Paradox, suggests economic
growth can only contribute to the maximization of happiness until a certain
level.
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2009), proponents of approach b), argue that
happiness economics confirms the economic model of behaviour. While they
briefly mention the Easterlin paradox as contradicting the economic model
of behaviour, they come to the conclusion that "happiness and life satis-
faction scores are related to true internal utility with some noise" (Di Tella
and MacCulloch, 2009). An explanation for the Easterlin Paradox is not
given.
Both approaches however are united by the idea of welfare as hedonic
happiness. The maximization of happiness follows as an appropriate goal.
There are several problems with this. As Amartya Sen argues, happiness can
not be used to compare the level of welfare of individuals (Sen, 2009, p.282f).
Reported happiness does not follow the same scale across individuals when
people tend to adapt their expectations to their situation. So it is possible
and rational for an objectively deprived person to report the same level
of happiness as a very well-off person. Also is it conceivable to find a
deprived population being lulled into happiness through propaganda. A
happy person, deprived of her subsistence means, can never be a wealthy
person by any sensible account. Further, any valid measure of welfare must
allow for the possibility of unhappiness. Being happy in the face of a tragedy
does not seem to be an appropriate response. Happiness in the face of the
death of a loved one for example, is neither healthy nor a morally sensible
reaction. Measuring welfare purely in terms of summing up pleasure does
not allow for unhappiness. Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2012) write that to
be happy without having reason to be happy is delusion. This delusion
is also known as ideology to conceal oppression (Skidelsky and Skidelsky,
2012, p.123). It is therefore necessary to specify the human needs, or as
Skildeskys put it: "Our proper goal, as individuals and as citizens, is not
just to be happy but to have reason to be happy." (p.123).
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2.3 Capability Approach
Amartya Sen largely accepts preference theory but takes issue with the
concept of utility and especially the aggregation of individual utilities to
measure total welfare. He writes: "We must conclude that none of the
interpretations of utility (pleasure, desire-fulfillment, choice) takes us very
far in pinning down well-being or the living standard." (Sen and Hawthorn,
1988, p.13) In his reluctance to break with the economic model of behaviour,
Sen refrains from using the word welfare and uses living standard, or well-
being, instead. It should not be forgotten that what proponents of the
economic model of behaviour have in mind when they are talking about
welfare is in fact the standard of living. Both concepts are referred to as the
ultimate goal of economic activity. Sen’s problem with utility is essentially
its character of total commodification of human life. He argues it to be
necessary to go beyond the mere accounting of commodities as a measure
for welfare (Sen and Hawthorn, 1988, p.15). This is the point where he
introduces the Capability Approach.
Welfare for Sen needs to be regarded as functionings and capabilities
instead of mere opulence of commodities (p.16). Functionings refer to the
various conditions of living. Capabilities describe the ability to achieve
the aspired outcome of these functionings. Sen illustrates his reasoning by
describing two men with different levels of food consumption. The man with
the higher intake of food however, has also a significantly higher metabolic
rate and a parasitic condition, which means he is actually undernourished
and therefore worse-off despite his higher level of consumption (p.15). The
measure of welfare should not be the level of goods consumption, but the
kind of life the person leads. Commodities are a means to an end, therefore
it is necessary to judge the ends and not the means. Welfare in the capability
approach is conceptualized as real opportunities available to the individual
(Sen, 2009, p.235).
This approach originally developed by Sen, was then further advanced
in collaboration with Martha Nussbaum. For both, the opportunities to
achieve, ergo the capabilities, are welfare. This is in order to allow the in-
dividual to preserve her freedom by allowing for choice (Sen, 2009, p.238),
(Nussbaum, 2000, p.69). Nussbaum, in contrast to Sen, lays forward a list
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of central capabilities which should be open to every individual (Nussbaum,
2000, p.70). Sen argues a list of central capabilities to be arbitrary. But
for both, assigning to the liberal tradition, what counts is not the actual
achievement of these capabilities, but the option to choose. Nussbaum’s
endeavor to identify central capabilities resembles the idea of the univer-
sality of human needs, which is an important aspect of human need based
approaches to welfare (see section 3).
While opportunity welfare is a big leap forward from commodity welfare,
Sen’s approach still requires the problematic assumption of authentic and
stable preferences. This reliance leads us to categorise the capability appro-
ach as a preference based approach. This is in contrast to O’Neill (2011)
who classifies the capabilities approach as needs based. However, welfare
can only be measured in opportunities, if behaviour reliably adheres to the
assumptions of economic preference theory. If preferences are subject to
various influences and able to change, opportunities can not be an absolute
measure for welfare as one can not know if an opportunity has been chosen
for authentical or other (e.g. social) reasons.
Interestingly, Sen himself discusses an adaptive phenomenon (Sen, 2009,
p.283). He argues that deprived people tend to adapt their expectations to
their situation. This leads him to criticize happiness economics’ approach
to welfare as interpersonal comparability of utilities becomes impossible
(see section 2.2). Sen however ignores that if expectations are adaptive,
preferences regarding the opportunities are also adaptive. This means the
relevance of opportunities is not equal for everybody but is endogenous to
the personal environment. Consequently, the availability of opportunities is
not sufficient to capture someone’s standard of living.
3 Human Need Based Approaches
In human need based approaches, welfare is conceptualized as the satis-
faction of specified human needs. Human needs can be classified according
to various criteria (Alkire, 2002).1 Distinguishing independent and incom-
1Max-Neef (1992, p.133f) organizes needs into two categories: existential and axio-
logical needs. He combines and displays four existential and nine axiological needs in
a matrix, which illustrates important aspects of the process of need satisfaction. The
four existential needs are: being, doing, having and interacting. The nine axiological hu-
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mensurable human needs breaks with preference theory, which rests on a
single measure for value and welfare. Another fundamental difference be-
tween a theory of human need and preference theory is that human needs
are conceptualized as finite and satiable while preferences, for the overall
consumption bundle, are assumed infinite and unsatiable.
Len Doyal and Ian Gough’s (1991) theory of human need is one of the
most elaborate in economics. Doyal and Gough claim their theory overlaps
significantly with other theories of human need like Max-Neef’s axiologi-
cal categories or Nussbaum’s central human functional capabilities (Gough,
2015, 2014). Doyal and Gough suggest two basic needs: health and auto-
nomy. The satisfaction of these two basic needs, to some degree, is conside-
red the prerequisite of a human individual being capable of forming its own
goals and striving to achieve these goals: "whatever the cultural practices
and values within which she [the individual] lives, she will require certain
prerequisites to strive towards those goals. In this way we identify physical
survival/health and personal autonomy as the most basic human needs ..."
(Gough, 2015, p.1197).
Autonomy is to be seen as a socially interdependent concept: "We define
basic autonomy as the ability to make competent informed choices about
what should be done and how to go about doing it. This foundation of
human purposive action is applicable to a wide variety of human contexts
and predicaments, from oppressive and totalitarian contexts to ones with
wide options for creative participation." (Gough, 2015, p.1197). Autonomy
is defined as the agency needed to participate in the social environment.
Autonomy is further advanced by the concept of critical-autonomy. Critical-
autonomy enables the individual to reflect on one’s own cultural setting,
compare it, and work together with other individuals to change it, or move
to another culture. Autonomy presupposes an inter-dependence, as people
build a self-conception through interaction (Gough, 2015, p.1199).
Doyal and Gough follow Max-Neef’s approach of the separation of needs
from need satisfiers (Max-Neef, 1992). Human needs are argued to be uni-
versal, i.e. constant over time and across cultures, while satisfiers may vary.
For Max-Neef the set of need satisfiers is one of the defining characteristics
man needs are: subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, leisure,
creation, identity, freedom.
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of culture itself. While human needs stay constant, what changes across
cultures and over time is the set of need satisfiers.
Satisfiers can vary in quality and quantity (Max-Neef, 1992, p.200). To
deal with the qualitative differences of satisfiers Max-Neef distinguishes five
types of need satisfiers: synergic satisfiers (e.g. brest-feeding, self-managed
production, pupular education), singular satisfiers (e.g. programmes to pro-
vide food, curative medicine, insurance systems), inhibiting satisfiers (e.g.
paternalism, taylorist-type of production, authoritarian classroom), pseudo-
satisfiers (e.g. mechanistic medicine ’a pill for every ill’, over-exploitation of
natural resources, chauvinistic nationalism) and violators or destroyers (e.g.
arms race, national security doctrine, censorship) (Max-Neef, 1992, p.205ff).
These types differ in their contribution to the actualization of needs. The
presence of the last three types of satisfiers is potentially destructive for
need satisfaction. Such destructive or non-beneficial satisfiers comply with
the social and cultural setting. They appear reasonable and legitimate but
actually hinder and limit the actualization of human needs.
The measurement of welfare flowing from Max-Neef’s approach requires
the identification and classification of satisfiers. The examples of the vari-
ous types of satisfiers illustrate that satisfiers can be thought of as social
structures or institutions. Identifying and analyzing the effects of social in-
stitutions is a key subject of critical institutional economics and the social
sciences in general. Thinking about social institutions in terms of satisfiers
provides a conceptual framework that acknowledges the effects of instituti-
ons on human need satisfaction.
Increases in potentially non-beneficial satisfiers are accompanied by the
threat of decreasing welfare irrespective of their effects on production and
consumption levels. In a publication entitled "Economic growth and quality
of life: a threshold hypothesis" Max-Neef explicitly discusses the limitations
of economic growth to create welfare (Max-Neef, 1995). The argument
rests on the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW). This indicator
considers non-beneficial aspects of production and economic activity in the
form of depletion of natural resources and ’defensive expenditures’ which are
ignored by production indicators. The ISEW levels off or even declines in
all countries, it has been calculated for, since the 1970s or 1980s (Max-Neef,
1995).
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To operationalize their human need based approach, Doyal and Gough
propose universal satisfier characteristics, or intermediate needs, as a cul-
tural bridge between universal basic needs and socially relative satisfiers.
Universal satisfier characteristics are conceptualized as properties of goods,
services, activities and relationships which enhance physical health and au-
tonomy in all cultures (Doyal and Gough, 1991, p.157). They name eleven
intermediate needs: adequate nutritional food and water, adequate pro-
tective housing, non-hazardous work environment, non-hazardous physical
environment, appropriate health care, security in childhood, significant pri-
mary relationships with others, physical security, economic security, safe
birth control and child-bearing, appropriate basic and cross-cultural educa-
tion.
To measure human need satisfaction in terms of universal satisfier cha-
racteristics requires identifying proper indicators. Doyal and Gough refer
to social and environmental indices in a broad and general way. What qua-
lifies certain social or environmental indices to represent specific universal
satisfier characteristics and the satisfaction of human needs has to be cla-
rified (Gough, 2015, p.1202-3). Also the identification of a minimum level
of need satisfaction for social participation, which avoids serious harm, and
a general level of satiation, which enables human flourishing via optimal
need fulfillment, poses measurement challenges in the approach of Doyal
and Gough (Gough, 2014, p.376ff).
3.1 Human needs, culture, behaviour
The human need based approaches of Max-Neef and Doyal and Gough pro-
vide a conceptualization of social relations and cultural institutions which
are lacking in preference based approaches. It has become clear that the
satisfaction of needs and satisfiers are social in nature.
In terms of the debate on structure versus agency (Archer, 2003), the
discussed human need based approaches can facilitate the analysis of the
effects of structure (i.e. social relations and cultural institutions) on the
actualization of needs. A concept of agency and a model of behaviour,
based on the satisfaction of human needs, is missing in these approaches.
The concept of agency in preference based approaches conceptualizes
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humans as autonomous. The economic model of behaviour consequently
denies structural influences on individual behaviour. These differences in
ontological and methodological premises between preference theory and hu-
man need based approaches illustrate the necessity for an alternative con-
cept of agency. The necessity for an alternative model of behaviour becomes
particularly visible when dealing with adaptive phenomena: Changes in in-
dividual aspirations, social relations, and cultural institutions require an
understanding of the role of peoples’ behaviour for those changes, and the
effects of those changes on peoples’ behaviour.
This void might be filled by self-determination theory which provides
a concept of agency that acknowledges the relevance of structure. Self-
determination theory proposes a model of behaviour that considers structu-
ral influences and links behaviour with need satisfaction. In the subsequent
section we give a brief introduction to self-determination theory and high-
light its connection to the aforementioned human need based approaches in
economics.
3.2 Self Determination Theory (SDT)
Conceptually, self-determination theory (SDT) is largely in accordance with
Gough and Doyal’s approach. While Doyal and Gough derived their set of
basic human needs logically, self-determination theory is empirically groun-
ded. Self-determination theory identified three basic psychological needs:
competence, autonomy and relatedness. Competence refers to an environ-
ment which promotes the feeling of empowerment and ability to achieve an
end. Autonomy is a sense of volition and self-determination to act. Au-
tonomy explicitly does not refer to the individualist idea of independence
and detachment, but is an inter-depended concept. Autonomy is not the
renouncement of social relations, but the feeling of acceptance and support
of one’s actions. Lastly, the need of relatedness refers to the feeling of be-
longing and significance to a social group, which provides a sense of security
(Ryan and Deci, 2000).
The specification of the three basic psychological needs emerged from
psychological research on various topics and was subsequently tested by a
number of authors across cultures and against other propositions of hu-
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man needs (Deci and Ryan, 2012, p.87). The founding fathers of self-
determination theory, Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci showed that
these three basic psychological needs are universal and apply to all hu-
man beings across all cultures. This does however not mean they take the
same form across all culture, but that the same underlying processes can
be identified across cultures (Ryan and Deci, 2000; Deci et al., 2001; Ryan
and Deci, 2001). This resembles the above mentioned distinction between
human needs and satisfiers.
The authors of both theories, Gough (2015) as well as Ryan and Deci
(2006) argue the concept of autonomy in Doyal and Gough’s theory of hu-
man need to be equal with the three basic psychological needs identified
by self-determination theory. Doyal and Gough’s autonomy incorporates
the three needs relatedness, competence and autonomy in SDT. Therefore,
the two basic needs autonomy and health, in Doyal and Gough’s approach,
might be interpreted as a distinction between psychological and physical
needs. This distinction, sometimes made in economics (Galbraith, 1970,
p.427), does however not mean that psychological and physical needs can
be separated at the level of the individual. Psychological and physical needs
can be considered as two sides of the same coin rather than separate entities.
Psychological needs can be seen as drivers of behaviour, and physical needs
as observable living conditions. This view obviously applies to Bentham’s
calculus of pleasure and pain and the utilitarian roots of the economic mo-
del of behaviour, in which decision taking is exclusively understood as the
result of psychological sensations of pleasure and pain.
Satisfaction of Human Needs and Wellness
Ryan and Deci claim that the satisfaction of their set of basic psychological
needs is necessary for the optimal functioning of a human being (Ryan and
Deci, 2000). Their definition of a basic need is borrowed from Clark Hull
(1966) and defined by a state, which if satisfied promotes well-being and
health and if dwarfed, drives towards malady and ill-being.
To capture optimal functioning (Sheldon and Ryan, 2011, p.33), self-
determination theory introduces the term wellness. In their early papers,
Ryan and Deci still use the term well-being for an individual’s full and vital
functioning, which they later replace by the notion of wellness (Ryan et al.,
1995).
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Wellness is distinguished from happiness, which refers to a subjectively
experienced positive mood (Ryan and Deci, 2011, p.47). Wellness conduces
towards happiness, but does not guarantee it. For example, unlike happi-
ness, wellness allows for the capacity to be unhappy, e.g. after the loss of a
loved one (Ryan and Deci, 2011, p.48).
Wellness is also distinguished from the hedonic concept of well-being
pioneered by Daniel Kahneman. Adhering to the utilitarian tradition, Kah-
neman defines well-being as the absence of pain, thus the summation of
positive affect (Kahneman et al., 1999, p.5). The similarities to the sum-
ranking of utility are non-coincidental, as both marginalist economics and
hedonist psychology have their origins in Benthamite utilitarianism (Scito-
vsky, 1976, p.15). As already discussed, neoclassical economics relies on
this hedonic psychological foundation, while at the same time denying it.
Wellness, in contrast to the hedonic conception of happiness, refers not to
an outcome (the presence of pleasure), but is concerned with the processes
and content of living (i.e. the full and vital functioning) (Ryan and Deci,
2011, p.47).
This distinction is very closely tied to Aristotle’s concept of Eudaimonia.
For Aristotle happiness entails a way of life and not a feeling. Eudaimonic
happiness refers to living a good life, defined as pursuing ends of intrinsical
worth and not to merely feeling good (Ryan et al., 2008). Accordingly, he-
donic pleasure is one outcome of wellness, but not its main concern. While
hedonic thinking is only concerned with the outcome, namely pleasure, eu-
daimonic thinking is concerned with the processes. Happiness is not the
focus, but the Good Life, the reasons to be happy are of main concern. Wel-
lness refers therefore not to pleasure but an "array of outcomes, including
subjective well-being, or happiness, as well as freedom from stress, anx-
iety, and depressive symptoms, and experiencing vitality and integration
in functioning" (Ryan and Deci, 2011, p.47). This is important, because
self-determination theory has shown that the focus on pleasure regardless
of the processes can actually lead to prescriptions dwarfing wellness (Ryan
et al., 2008).
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Measuring Need Satisfaction and Motivation
In SDT, optimal functioning of humans evolves around their motivation to
act. The individual can appear as active, engaged and self-motivated or as
passive, driven and alienated. Intrinsic motivation, which is authentic and
stems from the individual herself, is contrasted with extrinsic motivation,
that appears as an externally controlled action. It is shown that intrin-
sic motivation leads to enhanced performance, creativity and persistence
(Ryan, 1991), increased vitality (Nix et al., 1999) and overall wellness.
In accordance with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, two analytical ca-
tegories for aspirations are identified: intrinsic goals and extrinsic goals.
Goals describe the outcomes which people are pursuing. They are differen-
tiated from needs because goals refer to "learned desires", while needs are
"essential nutriments" (Deci and Ryan, 2008b).
Intrinsic goals are undertaken for their own sake, according to one’s own
values. Intrinsic goals like personal growth and building relationships are
pursued for autonomous reasons. They are ends to themselves and lead to
internal feelings of worth, which results from psychological need satisfaction.
Intrinsic goal pursuit and fulfillment is directly linked to the satisfaction of
the basic psychological needs. Extrinsic goals are instrumental and under-
taken as means for different ends.
Extrinsic goals are pursued for controlled reasons e.g.: the goals of wealth
or fame. They derive their worth from a different end than their own. They
rely on external indicators of worth. Extrinsic goals are in direct conflict
with the satisfaction of the basic psychological needs (Deci and Ryan, 2008a;
Ryan and Deci, 2000). The pursuit of extrinsic goals tends to crowd out
the satisfaction of basic psychological needs. Extrinsic goals turned out to
serve as "need substitutes" (Deci and Ryan, 2008b). Even when attained,
the pursuit of extrinsic goals is associated with lower health, wellness and
lower performance (Vansteenkiste et al., 2004).
The empirical findings of SDT show that goals are not exogenous to the
social environment. Goals are understood to be acquired as a function of
the social environment (Deci and Ryan, 2008b). By social environment,
self-determination theory refers not only to the immediate social surroun-
ding of an individual, but explicitly to the institutional setting or structure
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(Ryan and Deci, 2011). The economic, social and cultural setting fosters or
thwarts basic needs satisfaction and thereby defines goals. The degree to
which the basic psychological needs have been fostered respectively thwar-
ted over time, leads to the adaption of intrinsic goals respectively extrinsic
goals. Intrinsic goals are adapted in a social environment, which fosters ba-
sic psychological needs satisfaction. Reversely, extrinsic goals are adapted
in a social environment, thwarting psychological needs satisfaction (Deci
and Ryan, 2008b).
These findings illustrate that the effect of the social environment on
human need satisfaction is twofold. The social environment determines
which goals are adopted by the individual and it provides for the need
satisfaction. A positive feedback loop between goals and the satisfaction of
the basic psychological needs can be identified: Poor basic needs satisfaction
leads to the adoption of goals which are shown to undermine basic needs
satisfaction. This is because basic psychological needs satisfaction leads to
internal feelings of worth. If psychological needs are thwarted, they are
substituted with external indicators of worth, which do not contribute to
need satisfaction (Deci and Ryan, 2008a).
Certain goals are beneficial to the individual and society as a whole,
while others are not. The claim of non-beneficial goals is neither paterna-
listic nor normative. Non-beneficial goals are desired outcomes, which are
shown to diminish welfare even when attained. The adoption of extrinsic
or non-beneficial goals is not an act of irrationality, but the consequence of
certain social habitats.
The empirical findings of self-determination theory can be summed up
in the following way: The social environment is seen as a key to human
behaviour and wellness. It determines if the basic psychological needs of
a human being are met. Only if the social environment provides for auto-
nomy, competence and relatedness, the individual, groups and communities
can develop in a healthy manner. If the basic psychological needs are satis-
fied, the individual will appear with great motivation to be active. What
follows is that the satisfaction of the basic psychological needs is associated
with greater vitality, performance and overall wellness. If basic psycholo-
gical needs are not satisfied, the individual appears as idle and alienated.
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The non-satisfaction is linked to poor vitality, poor performance and poor
wellness. The level of psychological need satisfaction results from the extent
of intrinsic motivation and the pursuit of intrinsic goals in peoples’ lives,
which are the indicators for welfare.
Over the years SDT has contributed significantly to the measurement
of motivation and life aspirations (i.e. goals). Proponents of SDT have
compiled an impressive stock of tools for empirical research in a broad range
of topics and academic fields.2
4 Growth, Consumerism and Alienation
According to the economic model of behaviour, the imperative for econo-
mic growth and ever increasing consumption is assumed to be inherent to
individual preferences. Self-determination theory with its concept of basic
psychological needs provides an account of how new goals are imposed onto
the individual by one’s social environment. The empirical results of SDT
suggest that the ever-increasing demand for consumption goods in fact is
a product of the mode of production (i.e. the social environment) itself.
Sales-techniques, but also the work environment foster a focus on commo-
dity accumulation (i.e. extrinsic goals), which does not contribute to higher
wellness and welfare.
SDT emphasizes the role of a consumerist culture and economic institu-
tions in fostering extrinsic goals. Advertising and the glorification of wealth
and power directly thwart basic psychological needs satisfaction by creating
insecurities and anxieties (Deci and Ryan, 2012; Ryan and Deci, 2011). But
also corporate culture with its controlling use of competition and rewards
undermines basic psychological needs satisfaction and leads to the adaption
of extrinsic goals (Deci and Ryan, 2012). The pursuit and even attainment
of extrinsic goals however does not contribute to needs satisfaction. This
creates a vicious cycle. Intrinsic goals are further substituted with extrinsic
goals (Deci and Ryan, 2008b, 2012). Commodification of the human life
appears as the result of a social environment created by a societal focus on
the accumulation of commodities.
The role of economic theory on this process must not be neglected. The
2An overview of questionnaires and scales is available via the SDT webpage:
http://selfdeterminationtheory.org/.
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concept of commodity welfare extends out of the university into society, by
continuously advocating the importance of production. John K. Galbraith
famously discusses this influence of economic theory on the real-world: "If
goods are firmly established as the cause of happiness, the public will be
attentive and responsive to claims to reward on their behalf, and certainly
the relentless propaganda on behalf of goods must greatly increase the im-
portance attached to production. This, in turn, strengthens the position
of producers in the exercise of their sovereignty especially as regards the
community and the state. What can be so important as what they do?
Economics again assists by making the level of output the formal, mea-
surable accomplishment of the society." (Galbraith, 1970, pp. 474-5) The
economic model of behaviour is not neutral itself, creeping into the fabric
of the real world. With its focus on ends, it suggests incentives to guide
human behaviour. Due to its status these incentives then become the fiber
of our societies. Within the workplace, schools and universities but also in
social policies, (pecuniary) incentives become the guiding principle. These
incentives, omnipresent in western societies, may however run contrary to
the basic need of autonomy. In the name of freedom and efficiency, the
economic model of behaviour promotes heteronomy instead of autonomy.
The research of SDT shows that the dwarfing of autonomy leads to alie-
nation and lower performance, the opposite of the desired and expected
result. The economic model of behaviour becomes the advocate of the total
commodification of life with all its negative consequences on wellness and
welfare.
5 Conclusions
We showed that a synthesis of human need based approaches in economics
and psychology can enable a substantial progress in the conceptualization
and measurement of welfare. The concept of satisfiers developed and app-
lied in the approaches of Max-Neef and Doyal and Gough provides a fra-
mework to theorize the effects of social relations and cultural institutions
(i.e. social relations and structure) on human need satisfaction. Comple-
mentary to this, self-determination theory provides a concept of agency that
acknowledges the relevance of structure and allows to replace the ideas of
autonomous, self-interested preference function maximizers in mainstream
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economics. The model of behaviour put forward by self-determination the-
ory rests on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Pe-
ople are conceptualized as pursuing intrinsic or extrinsic goals. Which type
of goals are pursued turned out to be crucial for the actualization of needs.
Empirical research also reveals that the extent to which people pursue in-
trinsic or extrinsic goals largely depends on the social environment. This
finding highlights the relevance of social relations and cultural institutions
for behaviour and welfare.
Another important finding for the measurement of welfare is the identi-
fication of non-beneficial satisfiers and non-beneficial goals. Non-beneficial
satisfiers appear reasonable and legitimate but actually hinder and limit the
actualization of human needs. The empirical identification of non-beneficial
goals in self-determination theory implies that what people aspire is not ne-
cessarily a good indicator for how to improve their welfare. These findings
are clashing with the concept of authentic preferences.
Section 4 discusses consumerism as an example for a cultural institu-
tion and its potentially negative effects on welfare. This runs contrary to
the positive connection between welfare and consumerism, firmly establis-
hed in neoclassical theory, which fosters policies oriented towards economic
growth. The conventional view ignores that consumerism can lead to the
replacement of intrinsic goals and internal feelings of worth with extrinsic
goals and external indicators of worth. In this case economic growth leads
to alienation and reductions in human need satisfaction. The case of consu-
merism illustrates that understanding adaptive phenomena and the effects
of cultural institutions on need satisfaction is a key for designing economic
policies and establishing institutional structures that facilitate welfare.
Self-determination theory provides a model of behaviour and a concept
of agency which, if integrated, enables economics to deal with institutional
structures and cultural change. Self-determination theory thus is able to
substantially contribute to a consistent theoretical framework of heterodox
economics. Drawing on the wide range of empirical tools available in the
literature of self-determination theory, it has the potential to yield a welfare
indicator which solves the problems of the adaptive phenomena found in
alternatives to GDP. Contributing to the debate about the relation between
psychology and economics, we hope to initiate a fruitful exchange.
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